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Abstract
For two days in February 2018, 17 cybersecurity ed-
ucators and professionals from government and in-
dustry met in a “hackathon” to refine existing draft
multiple-choice test items, and to create new ones, for
a Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI) and Cyber-
security Curriculum Assessment (CCA) being devel-
oped as part of the Cybersecurity Assessment Tools
(CATS) Project. We report on the results of the
CATS Hackathon, discussing the methods we used
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to develop test items, highlighting the evolution of
a sample test item through this process, and offer-
ing suggestions to others who may wish to organize
similar hackathons.
Each test item embodies a scenario, question stem,
and five answer choices. During the Hackathon, par-
ticipants organized into teams to (1) Generate new
scenarios and question stems, (2) Extend CCI items
into CCA items, and generate new answer choices for
new scenarios and stems, and (3) Review and refine
draft CCA test items.
The CATS Project provides rigorous evidence-
based instruments for assessing and evaluating educa-
tional practices; these instruments can help identify
pedagogies and content that are effective in teach-
ing cybersecurity. The CCI measures how well stu-
dents understand basic concepts in cybersecurity—
especially adversarial thinking—after a first course
in the field. The CCA measures how well students
understand core concepts after completing a full cy-
bersecurity curriculum.
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Index terms— Cybersecurity Assessment Tools
(CATS) Project, cybersecurity education, Cyberse-
curity Concept Inventory (CCI), Cybersecurity Cur-
riculum Assessment (CCA), standardized test de-
sign.
1 Introduction
Presently there is no rigorous, research-based method
for measuring the quality of cybersecurity instruc-
tion. Validated assessment tools are needed so that
cybersecurity educators have trusted methods for dis-
cerning whether efforts to improve student prepara-
tion are successful. The Cybersecurity Assessment
Tools (CATS) Project [SOD+17] provides rigorous
evidence-based instruments for assessing and evalu-
ating educational practices.11 The first instrument is
a Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI) that mea-
sures how well students understand core concepts in
cybersecurity (especially adversarial thinking) after
a first course in the field. The second instrument is
a Cybersecurity Curriculum Assessment (CCA) that
measures how well students understand the same core
concepts after completing a full cybersecurity cur-
riculum and being ready to enter the workforce as
cybersecurity professionals. These tools can identify
pedagogies and content that are effective in teaching
cybersecurity.
In February 2018, we hosted a two-day “CATS
Hackathon” for 17 cybersecurity educators and pro-
fessionals from across the nation to generate multiple-
choice test items for the CCA, and to refine draft
items for the CCI and CCA. The meeting was a
“hackathon” in that participants collaborated on a
common task in an informal setting [Pin11]. Over
the past couple years, we had developed a bank of
about 36 questions for the CCI and about 12 draft
questions for the CCA. Participants used these ques-
tions as a starting point, extending CCI questions
to be CCA questions, refining draft CCA questions,
and devising new CCA questions entirely. The in-
timate in-person event facilitated productive inter-
actions among the participants, infusing fresh ideas
into the project, promoting awareness of the tools,
11http://www.cisa.umbc.edu/cats/index.html
and enhancing the quality of the test items.
We report on this Hackathon, illustrating with an
example how a question evolved through three teams
that conceived new scenarios and question stems,
generated answer choices, and reviewed draft ques-
tions. Finally, we document lessons learned from this
event.
2 The CATS Project
Inspired by the Force Concept Inventory (FCI) of
physics by Hestenes, et al. [HWS92], we are design-
ing the CCI and CCA to be rigorous assessment tools
relevant to a wide range of educational contexts.
Unlike the CISSP,12 which is largely informa-
tional, our instruments assess conceptual understand-
ing. Like the FCI, our new tests focus only on core
concepts to maximize applicability to a variety of cur-
ricula and thus are intentionally not comprehensive.
Our tests are intended to measure conceptual under-
standing, which is a critical, transferable skill. They
do not measure general problem-solving, design, an-
alytical, or interpersonal skills. They are intended to
compare teaching methods, not individual instruc-
tors. They are standard tests, broadly applicable to
many programs, that can be statistically analyzed
by established methods [HSJ93,JGJ+95,HCZL14] to
produce evidence for the efficacy, or lack thereof, of
diverse teaching approaches used in cybersecurity.
Each 50-minute test will comprise approximately
25 multiple-choice questions (MCQs), five on each of
the following five core concepts identified through our
Delphi Process [PDH+16]:13
1. Identify vulnerabilities and failures.
2. Identify attacks against the CIA14 triad and au-
thentication.
3. Devise a defense.
4. Identify the security goals.
12Certified Information Systems Security Professional
(CISSP) https://www.isc2.org/cissp/default.aspx
13A Delphi process solicits input from a set of subject mat-
ter experts to create consensus about contentious decisions,
sharing comments without attributions.
14Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA).
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5. Identify potential targets and attackers.
Each test item embodies three parts: a scenario,
a stem (question/prompt), and five answer choices
(alternatives). Several items may share the same
scenario, but each item has a unique stem and an-
swer choices. Each stem focuses on one targeted
concept, though scenarios may deal with multiple
concepts. Each stem has exactly one correct (best)
choice and four distractors (incorrect answer choices).
Test items should target the above timeless funda-
mental concepts, not merely factual information that
is memorized and recalled.
It is our intent that, for each core concept, the
five test items encompass a range of difficulty levels.
We recognize, however, that experts tend to be poor
judges of the difficulty of test items, so the actual
difficulty of each item will not be reliably known until
student testing.
The CATS Team developed draft test items using
the following structured process. Building on the five
core concepts identified in our Delphi Process, we
created scenarios and interview prompts, which we
used to interview students to uncover their miscon-
ceptions [THS+18]. It took significant planning, staff
time, and effort to carry out, record, transcribe, and
analyze these think-aloud interviews. Subsequently,
in discussions held in a conference room or on Skype,
we devised stems and answer choices. We based dis-
tractors mostly on student misconceptions we uncov-
ered through the interviews. Scenarios we developed
for these interviews provide rich case studies for many
learning activities [SDH+18]. To test draft questions,
we use the PrairieLearn System,15 developed at the
University of Illinois.
There is evidence that well-crafted MCQs can pro-
vide the same type of information as do Parsons
problems (open-ended problems). MCQs are easy
to grade and interpret, and there is a robust theory
for creating and analyzing them. Seventy-six per-
cent of our CCI Delphi experts agreed or strongly
agreed that, “A carefully constructed multiple-choice
assessment can provide valuable information for as-
sessing the quality of instruction in a first course in
15https://prairielearn.readthedocs.io/en/getting-started-docs/
cybersecurity.” Other types of assessments (e.g., sim-
ulations, hands-on activities, competitions) also have
much to offer but are more complex to create, main-
tain, administer, and analyze.
It is essential that these tools have strong usability
and validity, and that they are implemented widely in
diverse settings. Throughout, the project benefitted
from inputs from a wide variety of experts, beginning
with our Delphi experts [PDH+16]. We planned the
Hackathon to encourage and facilitate experts to col-
laborate on refining existing test items for the CCI
and CCA and developing additional test items for the
CCA. The project will continue forward with expert
reviews and pilot testing of draft test items.
3 The Hackathon
To generate new test items for the CCA, the 17
participants organized into several teams, each with
about three or four members. Each team focused
on one of the following tasks: (1) Generate new sce-
narios and question stems, (2) Extend CCI items
into CCA items, and generate new answer choices
for new scenarios and stems, and (3) Review and re-
fine draft CCA test items. These substantial tasks
kept each team fully engaged throughout the two-
day Hackathon. Each participant chose what team
to join, based in part on their skill sets.
The event took place at an off-campus conference
center, two days before the ACM SIGCSE16 confer-
ence in Baltimore. The experts represented 13 from
universities, two from industry, and two from govern-
ment. Participants took the CCI at the beginning of
the first day, and the CCA at the beginning of the
second day.
We now describe each task in more detail.
3.1 Task 1: Generate New Scenarios and
Question Stems
These teams started by brainstorming potential sce-
narios. Team members shared their scenarios and
developed a priority list of ones that needed further
development. Members then refined each scenario by
16ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Science Edu-
cati n (SIGCSE).
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adding details, identifying critical assumptions, and
drafting 1-4 candidate questions to probe student un-
derstanding of the scenario.
The guiding question for this task was, “Will the
new CCA item probe one of the identified five core
cybersecurity concepts?”
We strive to place complexity into the scenarios
rather than into the stems. Doing so helps enable
each stem to be as short and clear as possible and to
focus directly on an important concept. This strat-
egy also reduces the required time for students to
complete the test because multiple stems may share
a common scenario.
Participants found it helpful to build on life experi-
ences and to introduce an artifact, such as a program
fragment, log file, protocol, or architectural diagram.
To deemphasize the importance of information
knowledge, instead of referring to an object (e.g., the
SSL protocol), its name or acronym, we described
the crucial properties of the object (e.g., a protocol
that encrypts the transferred file, using a key estab-
lished by a key-agreement protocol between sender
and receiver.) To deemphasize vocabulary barriers,
we included at the end of each test item definitions of
any terms that students found unfamiliar (e.g., “mas-
querade”).
3.2 Task 2: Extend CCI Items into
CCA Items and Generate New Answer
Choices
These teams focused first on extending existing CCI
items to have greater technical detail, sophistication,
and complexity. Participants focused on the differ-
ences between students who have taken only a single
course versus students who have taken an entire cur-
riculum in cybersecurity.
Guiding questions for this task were, “What do
students know?” and “What misconceptions might
students have about this scenario?”
After extending the CCI items into CCA items,
these teams focused on developing correct answer
choices and distractors. To ensure that distractors
reflected student misconceptions, one member of the
CATS Team who had previously analyzed student
misconceptions in cybersecurity contributed his ex-
pertise [THS+18]. These teams exercised leeway to
modify scenarios or stems as needed to generate com-
pelling and clear correct answers and distractors.
3.3 Task 3 Review and Refine Draft CCA
Test Items
These teams refined and prioritized draft items and
made notes about the scenarios, stems, and alterna-
tives for future work. The teams first reviewed draft
CCA items that the CATS Team had previously cre-
ated, and then reviewed draft CCA items generated
by Task 2 teams. Members also kept track of how
many test items covered each core concept, and they
estimated the approximate difficulty of each item.
The guiding question for this task was, “Which
scenarios and stems are worthy of inclusion in the
CCA?”
These teams focused on quality control, making
sure that all wording was precise, concise, and clear.
One member of the CATS Team experienced in craft-
ing MCQs participated. Members ensured that each
test item stated all critical assumptions. Team mem-
bers answered each draft item and verified that ev-
eryone agreed on the correct answer.
Members applied best practices in writing effec-
tive multiple-choice questions, including advice of-
fered by the Vanderbilt Center for Teaching [Bra19].
Each stem should be meaningful by itself. The alter-
natives should be plausible, homogeneous, and non-
overlapping. Each test item should be easy for ex-
perts to answer, but hard for students with poor or
incomplete conceptual understanding.
Many difficulties could be resolved by adding more
detail, especially about the assumptions and adver-
sarial model. Whenever possible, we preferred to in-
sert such details into the scenario rather than into
the stem.
4 An Example: Forensic Analysis of a
Network Log File
We present a sample CCA test item that origi-
nated from Josiah Dykstra at the Hackathon and
evolved through several discussions and refinements,
both during the Hackathon and afterwards by the
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CATS Team. Dykstra is a government employee who
brought to the Hackathon significant knowledge and
experience in forensics, networks, cybersecurity, and
cloud computing.
Figure 1 gives the current polished version of test
item H2-1. It depends on scenario H2, which intro-
duces an artifact that is a network log file of cor-
porate user activity. Stem H2-1 probes Core Con-
cept 5 (identify targets and attacker) by asking the
student to identify the most serious malicious activ-
ity. We suggest that the reader now pause to answer
the question.
The CATS Team estimates the difficulty of this test
item to be medium. We consider this test item to be
more appropriate for CCA than for CCI because it
requires the student to understand a somewhat tech-
nical log file, however modest the technical aspects
may be.
To answer this test item, the student must read and
understand the log file and make inferences about it.
The student must determine who the adversary or
adversaries are and what they have done. To make
these inferences, the student must demonstrate some
technical ability to analyze a log file, common sense,
and adversarial thinking in a corporate network en-
vironment.
To help us keep track of our test items and their
status, for each test item we assign a line of meta-
data summarizing the item’s difficulty, status, core
concept, and secondary topic. The meta-data for test
item H2-1 is: “Medium, Ready, Identify Targets and
Attackers, Log Analysis.”
At the Hackathon, knowing that Dykstra is an ex-
pert in forensics, we suggested that he create a sce-
nario involving forensics. Needing more questions in-
volving “Identify Targets and Attackers,” we encour-
aged him to focus on that concept. We also suggested
that he introduce a technical artifact; for forensics,
the choice of using a log file was natural.
Originally, Dykstra proposed three stems for Sce-
nario H2, which we shall call H2-1a, H2-2a, and H2-3a
(see Figure 2). In the ensuing discussions, we settled
on only one stem. H2-3a did not seem to exercise
a very important concept, and H2-1a and H2-2a are
overly similar, and the answer to one gives a major
hint of the answer to the other.
We also modified the stem to focus more directly on
the important targeted concept of identifying what
malicious activity took place and by whom. As stems
should be, Stem H2-1 is a meaningful question by
itself.
Over multiple meetings, the team spent significant
time and effort polishing the test item. Much of that
effort went into improving the clarity of the item. It
is our experience that many students become con-
fused about various details, including ones that team
members had considered to be clear. Small changes
in wording can affect how students perceive a test
item. Our instruments should not be tests of in-
telligence or reading comprehension; each test item
should challenge a student’s conceptual understand-
ing of the targeted concept.
Edits included making the log file more uniform,
inserting additional information in the log file, and
clarifying the meaning of data up-loads and down-
loads. We added clarifying details about the file-
sharing service and who issued the workstations and
smartphones. We also finely edited the wording, for
example, replacing the strong verb “colluded” with
the softer and less suggestive diction “cooperated.”
While making such edits may seem simple, our ex-
perience is that it is difficult and time consuming to
construct quality test items.
In case the reader is uncertain, we note that an-
swer choice A is the best alternative for each of the
above stems. The sizes of the data flows provide use-
ful clues.
5 Discussion
The two-day Hackathon resulted in four promising
new CCA test items and useful feedback on all 36
draft CCI questions and 12 draft CCA questions. It
also increased awareness about our project, infused
new ideas into it, and established connections for pos-
sible future collaborations.
We learned that our choices for the event—
including its size, length, and structure—worked well.
Diversity of the participants, and interactions among
them, contributed greatly to the event’s success. Ask-
ing the participants to bring some of their favorite
questions (e.g., from final exams) is an effective way
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Scenario H2. Consider the following log of corporate user activity. The corporation issues each employee
a work PC and a smartphone.
Day Time User Action Device Data Volume [kilobytes]
May 21 20:22:28 Bob Local login Work PC 0 UP 0 DOWN
May 21 20:23:01 Bob Connection to local server Work PC 6,702 UP 244,328 DOWN
May 21 20:25:12 Bob Access to acmeshare.com Work PC 122,164 UP 3,456 DOWN
May 21 20:26:35 Bob USB drive connected Work PC 122,164 UP 0 DOWN
May 22 08:28:12 Alice Connection to remote host Work PC 122,164 UP 2,378 DOWN
May 22 08:32:12 Charlie VPN login to network Smartphone 2,490 UP 4,566 DOWN
May 22 08:38:55 Charlie Access to acmeshare.com Smartphone 0 UP 125,620 DOWN
NOTES:
(1) acmeshare.com is a fictional, free file-sharing service.
(2) UP and DOWN data transfer volumes are given from the perspective of the specified device.
Question H2-1. What is the most serious malicious activity possibly suggested by this log?
A. Bob, Alice, and Charlie cooperated to exfiltrate data.
B. Alice sent corporate secrets to some unspecified remote host.
C. Bob connected a USB drive and wrote sensitive data to it from his corporate work PC.
D. Charlie and Bob shared a malicious file via acmeshare.com.
E. Bob logged in from work at 20:22:28, after the authorized access times.
Figure 1: An example CCA test item that evolved from the Hackathon.
to involve everyone from the beginning.
The greatest challenge in running our Hackathon
was finding time in the schedules of busy experts.
Scheduling the Hackathon physically near and imme-
diately before a major relevant conference made it
more convenient for participants to attend. Support-
ing their travel also helped.
We encountered many challenges in developing
quality MCQs: The process takes a significant
amount of time and effort. Some appealing open-
ended questions (e.g., devising or comparing a design
or attack) are difficult to formulate as a MCQ with-
out depreciating the most attractive aspects of the
question. Often we found it hard to generate more
than three appealing distractors. We strived to make
the test items as timeless as possible, but this goal
was challenging to achieve, especially for the more
technical CCA.
While most experts liked the majority of our draft
questions, some experts disagreed with some of our
answer choices. The reason usually involved either
relative weights placed on various considerations or
that the expert made a hidden assumption. In such
cases, we edited the test item to add details and clar-
ify assumptions.
We are beginning to experiment with and study a
new method of generating distractors: online crowd-
sourcing. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, we have
collected open-ended responses to draft stems. Team
members analyzed the responses, observing groups of
similar incorrect answers, and noting whether the in-
correct responses are consistent with misconceptions
that we had expected. This method is fast and ef-
ficient and benefits from being able to use a spe-
cific stem. For 25 cents a response, we can easily
collect 50–100 responses overnight. Whereas crowd-
sourcing is unmoderated with no collaboration and
limited control of subjects, the Hackathon was mod-
erated and facilitated collaboration among carefully
selected participants.
It would be helpful to be able to use a suitable
integrated test-development system that supported
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Question H2-1a. Imagine you are an insider stealing corporate secrets. What change would you make in
this log to cover your tracks?
A. Modify all of the data volume entries with random values.
B. Delete the records of login actions.
C. Change all the timestamps to 00:00:00.
D. Erase the action field from all records.
E. Append 500 fake records to the log.
Question H2-2a. Which inference can you draw about the attack?
A. Alice, Bob, and Charlie are colluding in the attack.
B. The attack originated from a remote, external hacker.
C. The firewall is misconfigured.
D. Bob cannot be the attacker.
E. [to be written]
Question H2-3a. What other forensic data would implicate the insider(s)?
A. Network traffic captures.
B. Intrusion detection logs.
C. Firewall logs.
D. Browser history.
E. List of deleted files.
Figure 2: The original three stems and their answer choices proposed for Scenario H2.
version control, collaborative test item development,
record keeping, comments, expert review, cognitive
interviews, pilot testing, and psychometric testing.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any such sys-
tem. Instead of building and maintaining our own
system, we used a variety of existing tools, espe-
cially ones that support real-time collaboration, in-
cluding GitHub, Google Docs (including with the Ed-
ity HTML plugin), Skype, Survey Monkey, Excel,
and PrairieLearn. When developing test items, we
found it especially helpful to engage in a remote con-
ference during which the participants could simulta-
neously edit a common file. It is highly desirable,
for each test item, to maintain exactly one authentic
source file, to avoid inevitable errors that will result
from copying or converting test items. Edity helped
us achieve this goal, albeit imperfectly, given that
PrairieLearn inputs test items as HTML files.
As evidenced from feedback submitted via a Sur-
veyMonkey questionnaire, the majority of partici-
pants found the Hackathon fruitful and that it pro-
duced valuable products. Participants stated that the
collaboration with diverse stakeholders was particu-
larly valuable to address the diverse and evolving field
of cybersecurity education. All of the participants
indicated that they would be willing to continue con-
tributing to the development of the instruments and
that they would administer pilot versions of the tests.
This year, we are completing development of the
draft CCA while beginning validation studies of the
CCI. These validation studies include cognitive inter-
views, expert review, small-scale pilot testing, and
large-scale psychometric testing. We also plan to
carry out several half-day “mini-hackathons” associ-
ated with various cybersecurity educational confer-
ences. We welcome participation in these studies and
those to follow for the CCA.
Our experience with the Hackathon demonstrates
that this type of collaborative workshop is an effec-
tive way to generate and improve test items and to
7
raise awareness about the project. We hope that
the resulting instruments will help identify effec-
tive strategies for teaching and learning cybersecurity
concepts.
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